published in maritime.bg
The ongoing destructive attacks against the merchant fleet in the Black Sea—specifically within Bulgaria’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) during October—raise numerous questions, including those of a legal nature.
The attack on the *CONTSHIP JET* (flying the Liberian flag) was the latest incident to occur in October 2026.
Online media sources report the following recent attacks within the Romanian and Bulgarian EEZs:
*ROYAD MAMMADOV* (October 5) – sunk in the Romanian EEZ;
*ALFA WATAN* (October 6) – sunk in the Bulgarian EEZ;
*ABLE* and *CHELSEA-3* (October) – struck within the Bulgarian EEZ;
*HS DIGNITY* (October 13) – sunk in the Bulgarian EEZ;
*YARA J* (October 14) – struck within Romanian territorial waters;
*WINE TRADER* (October 15) – struck in the Romanian EEZ;
*KHORYV* (October 23) – struck in the Romanian EEZ.
With this latest attack—which left the vessel partially submerged and still posing a navigational hazard to shipping—the total number of attacks within Bulgaria’s Exclusive Economic Zone has reached five in the span of a single month. The frequency and sheer number of these attacks—along with their visible consequences, the most severe being loss of life, physical injuries to crew, the destruction or loss of cargo, and, crucially, the destruction of vessels—necessitate an urgent analysis of the situation and the associated risks.
Less immediately apparent are the environmental risks posed to the water, air, flora, and fauna. Debris and hazardous remnants from sunken vessels and their cargoes could reach territorial waters and the coastline, posing a direct threat to the local population. Containers from a sunken container ship have already been observed surfacing.
Furthermore, the attacks themselves—along with the wreckage of vessels that have not yet fully sunk—create navigational hazards. This elevates the risk to maritime security, which in turn diminishes, or even entirely halts, commercial shipping traffic. Underwater cables and systems installed on the seabed also face risks, necessitating continuous monitoring.
От друга страна, атаките като такива, и все още непотопените останки като навигационен риск, повишават нивото на риск за сигурността на корабоплаването, което понижава, дори елиминира търговския корабоплавателен поток. Опасност и необходимост от непрекъснат мониторинг се наблюдава и по отношение на подводните окабелявания и системи, които са инсталирани на дъното на морето.
Additional consequences of these attacks include a shortage of crews willing to operate in the Black Sea, a reluctance among shipowners and charterers to risk voyages in the region, and—inevitably—soaring insurance premiums. These higher costs increase the final price of transported goods, prompting traders to seek alternative, more efficient logistics solutions. The prospect of the Black Sea becoming empty, our ports falling into desolation, and importers of goods opting for alternative routes and logistics is becoming increasingly palpable.
Бъдещето на Черно море да остане празно, пристанищата ни да опустеят, вносителите на стоки да изберат друг подход и логистика, е все по-осезаемо.
Naturally, the entire situation also impacts tourism and the population at large, in a purely human sense. We are not in a state of war, but can we definitively say that we are in a state of peace?!
Съгласно медийно разпространените данни, атаките в ИИЗ на България са се случили в рамките на разстояние от 12 до 24 милната зона, тоест в т.нар. ПРИЛЕЖАЩА ЗОНА на Република България.
According to information circulated in the media, the attacks within Bulgaria’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) occurred between 12 and 24 nautical miles from the coast—that is, within what is known as the *Contiguous Zone* of the Republic of Bulgaria.
As has become well known recently, this area does not constitute the country’s territorial sea, nor does Bulgaria’s sovereign airspace extend over it. The principle of free, peaceful passage applies here—including the free passage of warships.
However, Bulgaria possesses internationally recognized powers within this zone, which are also codified in its national legislation. These are specific authorities related to addressing violations committed within the country’s territory or its territorial sea—and, notably, to the *prevention* of such violations.
The Contiguous Zone is considered part of what are termed the “maritime spaces” of the Republic of Bulgaria. This is established under the *Law on the Maritime Spaces, Internal Waterways, and Ports of the Republic of Bulgaria*. The Contiguous Zone was also defined in the 1962 *Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone*. Currently, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea governs most maritime matters, including the contiguous zone.
Within the contiguous zone, the Republic of Bulgaria exercises control to prevent violations of customs, fiscal, border, and sanitary/health regulations applicable within the country—including within its territorial sea—and holds jurisdiction to penalize those who violate these provisions.
Thus, as a coastal state, Bulgaria possesses a legal basis—or at the very least, sufficient justification—to exercise specific powers; in other words, Bulgaria is entitled to exercise control within the zone adjacent to its territorial sea.
Should there be evidence that a foreign non-military vessel located in the contiguous zone has violated, or is preparing to violate, such rules and regulations, the authorities of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence are empowered to stop the vessel, conduct an inspection, and take the necessary measures to prevent the violation or detain the vessel in order to hold the responsible parties accountable.
Thus, as a coastal state, Bulgaria possesses a legal basis—or at the very least, sufficient justification—to exercise specific powers; in other words, Bulgaria is entitled to exercise control within the zone adjacent to its territorial sea.
However, these rights are not sovereign in nature; consequently, other states also possess… the authority to exercise these powers. Given that Bulgaria is part of the EU, I believe that all Member States—as well as the EU itself—have the capacity to consider measures to protect the Union’s eastern flank against an imminent violation, particularly one posing an environmental threat. Such a threat could involve the spread of hazardous substances or even the outbreak of diseases, potentially including the contamination or impairment of marine fishery resources.
These powers pertain to objects at sea—specifically, foreign non-military vessels. Can a maritime drone be classified as a “vessel”? I would argue not strictly, but by analogy, it could be treated as such—provided there is no other specific legislation or legal regime governing the scenario of uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs)—also known as drone boats, sea drones, or water drones. In international law, the general term used is “watercraft.”
In this context, if there is evidence that such a watercraft—a maritime drone—is preparing to violate regulations or requirements that form part of the legal order of the Republic of Bulgaria (such as border control or public health regulations), then Bulgaria has the authority to exercise control. Theoretically, this includes the power to intercept the watercraft, conduct inspections, detain it, and penalize the violators—whether they be the owners or operators of the craft (should they be identified). The key point here is that, under the International Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and Bulgarian legislation, the authorities have the mandate to prevent such violations.
Bulgaria possesses what is known as the “right of pursuit” (or “hot pursuit”) under the Law on Maritime Spaces.
Article 66: A foreign non-military vessel may be pursued and detained for the purpose of holding it accountable if there are reasonable grounds to believe that it has committed, or is preparing to commit, a violation of financial, customs, border, or health regulations within the contiguous zone.
Pursuit commences when a foreign vessel fails to comply with a signal to stop.
Pursuit is carried out by vessels or aircraft belonging to the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defence—or by other authorized state vessels and aircraft—displaying the appropriate identifying markings.
With the caveat mentioned earlier—that the legal regime governing the contiguous zone may be applied by analogy to drones (at least until a specific legislative framework is established)—it follows that, under current legislation, both Bulgaria and other EU member states have the authority to monitor and gather information regarding unmanned systems, attempt to identify them, issue signals, initiate communication, and order them to stop. In practice, all of this unfolds within minutes. If all data points to a hostile unmanned vehicle with a clear objective and an imminent risk of an impact—one that would cause damage to the environment and marine resources, including underwater and seabed infrastructure within the contiguous zone of Bulgaria and/or Romania (and, by extension, the EU)—then the naval authorities of either nation should have the latitude to take the necessary steps to stop the craft. It is my view that, should no other means of stopping it be available, the use of force—up to and including destruction—is an option, provided, of course, that there is no risk to human life.
This entire matter is a subject for discussion—both within the context of the NATO initiative on countering drones (in which the Bulgarian government is expected to participate) and within the EU and its member states, regarding plans to deploy an EU naval operation in the Black Sea.
I believe that the international legal framework will be addressed within the scope of these initiatives, including… …the possibilities afforded by international agreements (such as the Montreux Convention or the SUA Convention—the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005), as well as the legal regulations concerning the risks of marine pollution.
Finally, I would like to emphasize my personal view: regardless of the existing legal framework—or the lack thereof—regarding maritime drones and attacks within the contiguous zone, this cannot serve as a justification for inaction when human lives and our sea are at risk! Kudos to all the specialists and personnel involved in maritime search and rescue operations! Now is the time for everyone working in this field to collaborate closely with the relevant institutions and to urgently secure funding to procure the equipment necessary for future rescue operations. The growing need for such capabilities is evident—one need only look at the headlines:CNN); Reuters – The war in Black sea is escalating puting NATO’s red lines to the test (Reuters).
IMO is concerned and published information that 100 vessels were lost in Black and Azov seas from June to now. This really looks like a war.
Attorney Veselina Kirilova, PhD researcher on shipping law, managing partner of VKBG LAW OFFICE – www.vkbglaw.com


